Adjudication Case Law Update 2026: Part 1

In Part 1 of our 2026 Court Decision Summaries, Kenneth Salmon MCIArb, consultant solicitor to Slater Heelis Limited and Kuits LLP, summarises recent court decisions concerning the enforcement of adjudicators' Awards under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996.   

This issue comprises a case arising on assignment, the exceptional refusal of summary judgment based on doubt as to the underlying contract, and natural justice – a classic case of ‘sour grapes’. 

In Part 1

Assignment – assignee’s right to adjudicate   

Paragon Group Ltd v FK Facades Ltd [2026] EWHC 78 (TCC)(judgment 20 January 2026) 

Jurisdiction – existence of foundational contract  

High Tech Construction Ltd v WLP Trading and Marketing Ltd [2026] EWHC 152 (TCC) (judgment 30 January 2026) 

Natural justice 

Project one London Ltd v VMA Services Ltd [2025] EWHC 3384 (TCC)(judgment 18 December 2025)


Legislation

The ‘Act’ means the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, as amended by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 Pt 8. The ‘new’ provisions apply to contracts entered into on or after 1 October 2011. The Act applies to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 

The main regulations are contained in the Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 (the ‘Principal Regulations’).[1] They have been amended by the Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2011 [2] (the ‘new Regulations’). The new Regulations apply only to contracts for construction operations in England entered into on or after 1 October 2011. 

For earlier contracts, the Principal Regulations apply. Northern Ireland has its own scheme: the Scheme for Construction Contracts in Northern Ireland 1999, as amended by the Scheme for Construction Contracts in Northern Ireland (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2012. The Northern Ireland Scheme is broadly similar to that in force in England and Wales. 

There are separate regulations for contracts for work in Scotland, applicable to contracts made on or after 1 November 2011. [3] The new Regulations apply only to contracts for work in Scotland entered into on or after this date. For earlier contracts, the Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 1998 [4] applies. There are new separate regulations for Wales, applicable to contracts for construction operations in Wales entered into on or after 1 October 2011. [5] 

A reference to ‘the Scheme’ is to the Principal Regulations for England and Wales, or the Scheme for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, as the context requires.


Summary

Assignment – assignee’s right to adjudicate   

Paragon Group Ltd v FK Facades Ltd [2026] EWHC 78 (TCC)(judgment 20 January 2026) 

Though the point was finely balanced, in the end the court held that an assignee of a lawful legal assignment of the rights and benefits of a construction contract was, having regard to the terms the contract in question, entitled to adjudicate its claim against the original other party to the contract. The claim arose under the contract and not under the assignment.  

Jurisdiction – existence of foundational contract   

High Tech Construction Ltd v WLP Trading and Marketing Ltd [2026] EWHC 152 (TCC) (judgment 30 January 2026) 

The court refused to enforce the adjudicator’s award where the defendant had a reasonable prospect at trial of showing that the contract on which the award was founded could be shown not to have existed.  
 

Natural justice

Project one London Ltd v VMA Services Ltd [2025] EWHC 3384 (TCC) (judgment 18 December 2025) 

Standing back from the detail, this was a classic case of a losing party combing through the adjudicator's reasons and identifying points on which to present a challenge under the labels ‘excess of jurisdiction’ or ‘breach of natural justice’. The task of the adjudicator was not to act as arbitrator or judge, but to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. That was what this adjudicator did. 
 

Court decision summaries in full  

Assignment – assignee’s right to adjudicate   

Paragon Group Ltd v FK Facades Ltd [2026] EWHC 78 (TCC) (judgment 20 January 2026) 

This was an adjudication summary enforcement claim by Paragon against FK Facades for a relatively modest sum of £80,500. The sole issue was whether Paragon as the assignee of the original employer was entitled to refer its claim against FK, the original contractor to adjudication. Paragon claimed that it had the right to do as the assignee of ‘all of [the employer's] rights, title, interest and benefit in and to’ a building contract, which was made between the original employer (the assignor) and FK.  The answer to the issue would determine whether the adjudicator had had jurisdiction to make the award which Paragon sought to enforce. Surprisingly it appeared there was no direct authority on the point. 

The contract in question was a JCT Minor Works Building Contract 2016 ed. with amendments for remedial works to a commercial property in Manchester, UK.  

The contract identified ‘the employer’ as Office Depot International (UK) Limited (ODI) and ‘the contractor’ as FK. These terms were used throughout the contract, both in the articles and the conditions. There were references elsewhere to each as a ‘party’ and, in particular, to ‘either Party’ in Article 6 (adjudication), and again in clause 7.2 - also headed ‘adjudication’. The term ‘the parties’ was used more generally throughout the contract to refer to the employer and the contractor in the plural, or the term ‘the party’ in the singular where it was not necessary to identify the individual party as either employer or contractor. This was consistent with the definitions of employer and contractor. It followed that in Article 6 and clause 7 the reference to ‘either party’ was shorthand for ‘either the employer or the contractor’. 

Clause 3.1 of the contract was amended to: 

1. The employer may assign or charge the benefit of this contract at any time without the contractor's consent;
   
2. The contractor shall not assign, novate or charge the benefit of this contract without the employer's prior written consent.  

There were two assignments: the first from the original employer (ODI) to the first assignee (OTG), the second from OTG to Paragon, both notified to FK. The assignments were lawful under the terms of the contract and each operated as a legal assignment under section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 

Paragon considered FK was in culpable delay, terminated the contract and claimed liquidated damages. FK disputed liability and Paragon referred the dispute to adjudication. FK took various jurisdictional points, and the only one now relied on was the right of Paragon as assignee to adjudicate. The adjudicator decided he had jurisdiction and proceeded to make an award in favour of Paragon.

Assignment  

The court was referred to Chitty on Contracts 36th Ed. paragraphs 23-001 and 004 for the general principles.  

Section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provided, as relevant, that Section 136(1) is ‘any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor...of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the debtor ... is effectual in law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer from the date of such notice — (a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action; (b) all legal and other remedies for the same’.  

It was not disputed that this was a statutory assignment and the effect was to assign not only the legal right to the things in action but also all legal and other remedies for the same. The court was also referred to Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128. At page 132, Lord Esher MR explained the effect of a statutory assignment: ‘the words mean what they say; they transfer the legal right to the debt as well as the legal remedies for its recovery. The debt is transferred to the assignee and becomes as though it had been his from the beginning; it is no longer to be the debt of the assignor at all, who cannot sue for it, the right to sue being taken from him; the assignee becomes the assignee of a legal debt and is not merely an assignee in equity, and the debt being his, he can sue for it, and sue in his own name’.  

A more recent overview of assignment and novation was given by O’Farrell J in Energy Works (Hull) Ltd v MW High Tech Projects UK Ltd and Ors [2020] EWHC 2537 (TCC). The court was referred by FK to the case of Bexhill UK Ltd v Razzaq [2012] EWCA Civ 1376 where Aikens LJ stated: ‘It is important to recall the effect of an assignment of a right...The assignee becomes either the legal or beneficial owner of the thing in action and its benefits. [The assignee] does not become a party to any contract or deed which contains or gives rise to the right. The assignee will only become a party to the contract (or deed) if there is a novation’.  

The court then looked at the provisions of the Act and the Scheme and noted that:

1. The right conferred by s.108 of the act to refer a dispute arising under a construction contract for adjudication under a procedure complying with this section and that such right is conferred on ‘a party’ to that construction contract. The remainder of the relevant provisions of the HGCRA also refer to a ‘party’ or the ‘parties’. It provides that (a) the decision of the adjudicator is only binding ‘until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration...if applicable...or by agreement; (b) if the contract does not comply with the requirements of s.108, the adjudication provisions of the scheme shall apply.  
   
   
2. Under paragraph 1(1) of the Scheme ‘any party to a construction contract (the referring party) may give written notice (the ‘notice of adjudication’) at any time of their intention to refer any dispute arising under the contract, to adjudication’.  
   
   
3. Under paragraph 1(2) ‘the notice of adjudication shall be given to every other party to the contract’. 
   
   
4. Under paragraph 1(3) ‘the notice of adjudication shall set out briefly (a) the nature and a brief description of the dispute and of the parties involved and (d) the names and addresses of the parties to the contract’. 
   
   
5. Paragraph 2(1) envisages that the ‘parties to the dispute' may agree who shall act as adjudicator. The same expression is used in paragraph 4. In paragraph 5(2), reference is made to ‘the other party to the dispute’, and in paragraph 7(3), reference is made to ‘every other party to the dispute’.   

These terms also appear in later paragraphs of the Scheme. Paragraph 8 refers to ‘all the parties to those disputes’ in the context of the adjudicator being empowered, with the consent of everyone, to determine more than one dispute under the same contract. By paragraph 13(a), the adjudicator is empowered to ‘request any party to the contract to supply them with such documents as they may reasonably require’, and by paragraph 13(c), to ‘meet and question any of the parties to the contract’.


The rival contentions 

It was now well established that the right to adjudicate was contractual in nature. In this contract it emanated from Article 6, which imported the scheme into the contract via clause 7.2. It followed and was not in dispute that the interpretation of the adjudication provisions in the contract was governed by the well-established principles applicable to the interpretation of contacts conveniently and succinctly summarised by Birss LJ in Assia v BT  [2023] EWCA Civ 451 (paragraphs 17-20), which the court adopted and applied. 

FK submitted that it is clear from the literal wording of the contract, of which the most important part was the incorporated provisions of the scheme, that only a party to the construction contract could refer a dispute to adjudication. It was also clear in the words used in the scheme, read with the analysis in Bexhill UK Ltd v Razzaq, that an assignee did not become a party to the construction contract. Even if that was wrong, since the right to adjudicate only extends to disputes or differences arising ‘under the contract’, a dispute by an assignee was not a dispute arising under the contract, since it arose under the assignment. Commercial commonsense supported that conclusion, given the difficulties and complications which may arise from allowing an assignee to refer a dispute to adjudication. 

Paragon submitted that a proper interpretation of the whole contract, most relevant being clause 7.2, when read with the definition of a party and clause 3.1 as amended, and when read with an understanding of the general law in relation to assignments, showed that a party included any statutory assignee of the original employer or contractor who also had the right to refer disputes to adjudication. It followed that a dispute arising under the contract was apt to include a claim arising under the contract even where referred by an assignee. The difficulties and complications identified by FK were, on analysis, insubstantial. 

The correct interpretation of the contract – can a party include an assignee from an original party? 

There was no direct authority on the point of which the court was aware or was referred to. Having concluded an unprofitable review of previous authorities, the court returned to consider the contract. 

FK’s argument benefited from simplicity – if the party is defined as ‘the employer’ or the ‘the contractors’ and the scheme gives the right to adjudicate to ‘any party to the construction contract’, then only the employer or contractor can refer a dispute to adjudication. However, the court was not convinced by that analysis. The remaining references in the scheme to a ‘party’ or ‘parties’ did not make clear that only the original parties to a contract could adjudicate.  

These references were essentially neutral, especially as the scheme referred without distinction to the ‘parties’, the ‘parties to the contract’, and the ‘parties to the dispute’ without making it obvious that a reference to a ‘party’ was consciously intended to refer back solely to a ‘party to the construction contract’. Indiscriminate use of the terms drew no distinction between an original party to the contract and a legal assignee of that party. References in the scheme to a ‘party’ could easily be read as including ‘or any legal assignee of such party, where applicable’ without doing violence to the scheme.  

The court accepted Paragon’s submission that the primary operative contractual provision in relation to adjudication was Article 6 which, when read with the relevant definition of party inserted, stated: ‘If any dispute or difference arises under this contract the employer or the contractor may refer it to adjudication in accordance with clause 7.2’. 

While the employer and the contractor were the original parties to the contract, clause 3 even as amended allowed the original party to assign the benefit of the contract to a third party, albeit in the case of the contractor only with consent of the employer. If one then asked whether a party included an assignee, the question was to be answered with the benefit of assumed knowledge of the general law of contract and of assignment. 

In the judgment of the court, that carried with it three points: 

1. On a strict legal analysis, an assignee did not become a ‘party’ to the contract in the full sense as one who took a novation and assumed both the benefit and burden of the contract for all purposes. 
   
   
2. In strict legal analysis, a statutory assignment of the benefit of ‘a thing in action’ under the contract, passed the legal right to the thing and all legal rights and other remedies for the same, which were transferred to the assignee as if they had been theirs from the beginning, and which would in the court’s judgment - absent express provision to the contrary - include the right to adjudicate. 
   
   
3. We might expect a permitted assignee to have the rights and remedies passing at law with the rights assigned, unless or to the extent that such rights were excluded, expressly or by necessary implication. 

Any practical difficulties identified by FK were more apparent than real and could in practice be overcome, and parties were free to stipulate that a right of adjudication could not be assigned. The difficulties that would arise would be even greater if the assignee was unable to adjudicate, unless the assignor was prepared to agree and to lend their name. 

In the end, the court found the point finely balanced, but was satisfied that on an objective interpretation of the contract an assignee could adjudicate an assigned claim against the original other party and that the adjudicator had jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to him by Paragon. The contract and the scheme could be read as if the words ‘or any legal assignee of such party, where applicable’ were read into the definition of a party, in much the same way as they could be and were read into the definition of a contracting party where it was afforded remedies under a standard commercial contract where assignment was permitted. 

The court found that FK’s alternative argument –that a claim by an assignee did not arise under the contract – had no freestanding merit. If the assignee was a party to the contract by virtue of the assignment, then it was obvious that any claim which they brought in their capacity as assignee was a claim arising under the contract, because that would be the only claim which they could advance in their capacity as assignee.  Summary judgment was given for Paragon. 

Jurisdiction – existence of foundational contract   

High Tech Construction Ltd v WLP Trading and Marketing Ltd [2026] EWHC 152 (TCC) (judgment 30 January 2026) 

HTC applied for summary judgment to enforce an adjudicator's decision awarding them over £2 million plus interest against WLP. The claim arose from the construction of a residential development in London. The central issue was whether the works were governed by a JCT Design and Build Sub-Contract made in January 2023, as alleged by HTC, or by two separate contracts for enabling works and reinforced concrete frame works respectively, as claimed by WLP.  

HTC contended that the adjudicator would have jurisdiction whether the foundational contract was the January JCT contract or the two later contracts. As such, his decision could not be challenged. WLP said that the adjudicator's determination as to the existence of the January JCT Contract (and the rejection of WLP's case) was jurisdictional and not binding on the parties. The leading authority directed to this issue was the Court of Appeal decision in Pegram Shopfitters v Tally Weijl (UK) Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 2082. In that case, summary judgment was awarded at first instance, but the Court of Appeal held that both parties opposing contentions as to the foundational contract were properly arguable and that summary judgment should not have been awarded.  

On the facts, the court found that WLP had a ‘real prospect’ of establishing at trial that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction because he was appointed under a contract (the January JCT contract) that potentially did not exist.  

Looking at Pegram, and after an extensive review of other authorities, the court concluded that where there was a fundamental dispute about the existence of the ‘foundational contract’ under which an adjudicator was appointed, and that challenge had a real prospect of success, summary judgment was inappropriate. The jurisdictional issue in this case was to be distinguished from cases involving the misdescription of contractual terms. The court emphasised that its decision rested on the assertion and evidence that the January JCT contact ‘did not exist’. The authorities showed that where jurisdiction was founded on the ‘wrong’ contract, that could negate the validity of the adjudicator’s appointment and would affect which contract terms the adjudicator had to consider.  

The court would not have refused judgment based on WLP’s assertion that the foundational contract comprised two separate contracts, as this rested on ‘new evidence’ adduced on enforcement which was not put forward in the adjudication and was not to be allowed in the enforcement proceedings. 

It was unnecessary to decide WLP’s alternative argument that the award had been procured by fraud. 
 

Natural justice 

Project one London Ltd v VMA Services Ltd [2025] EWHC 3384 (TCC)(judgment 18 December 2025) 

The claimant ‘POL’ sought to enforce an adjudicator’s award in its favour. The defendant ‘VMA’ resisted enforcement on three ‘natural justice’ grounds.


Background 

The parties entered into a contract in 2023 based on POL's Sub-Contract Order, incorporating the JCT Design and Build Sub-Contract Agreement Conditions 2016, for the design and installation of mechanical works at Cheyne Walk in London. The contract sum was £387,696.36.  

In June 2024, VMA applied for interim payment number 8 (AFP8) in the sum of £274,259.81, leaving a net value of the works complete, less retention, of £260,546.83, with a payment due of £106,434.88 after the deduction of previous payments. POL gave no payment or pay less notice.  

VMA referred the dispute over non-payment to adjudication in which POL invited the adjudicator to award them a sum of money. The adjudicator decided that AFP8 was a notified sum and must be paid before any true value adjudication could be addressed and ordered POL to pay POL £112,033.65, including interest. There were enforcement proceedings and the award was paid. 

POL then commenced a true value adjudication as to AFP8 and a different adjudicator was appointed. The adjudicator decided the true value of AFP8 net of retention was £157,890.16 and asked VMA to repay the sum of £102,656.67 to POL by 25 September 2025, with no interest awarded. 

The judge began by setting out the principles to be applied in adjudication enforcement. In respect of alleged breaches of natural justice, the court referred to the case of Roe Brickwork v Wates Construction [2013] EWHC 3417 (TCC) and, in particular, the following (from paragraphs 23-24):  

‘If an adjudicator has it in mind to determine a point wholly or partly on the basis of material that has not been put before him by the parties, he must give them an opportunity to make submissions on it. For example, he should not arrive at a rate for particular work using a pricing guide to which no reference had been made during the course of the referral without giving the parties an opportunity to comment on it. 

By contrast, there is no rule that a judge, arbitrator or adjudicator must decide a case only by accepting the submissions of one party or the other. An adjudicator can reach a decision on a point of importance on the material before him on a basis for which neither party has contended, provided that the parties were aware of the relevant material and that the issues to which it gave rise had been fairly canvassed before the adjudicator. It is not unknown for a party to avoid raising an argument on one aspect of its case if that would involve making an assertion or a concession that could be very damaging to another aspect of its case.’ 

The court noted the important limitations on these principles set down by the court of appeal in Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard [2006] BLR 15, noting that a beach of the rules of natural justice must be material and not peripheral before it can affect enforcement. It was no grounds for resisting enforcement for a party to point out that the adjudicator had misunderstood the evidence or the law. 

VMA’s complaints 

• The air conditioning (‘A/C’) - VMA complained that the adjudicator had focused on reducing the value claimed for A/C including pipework, having already decided that the A/C was not defective as alleged by POL. The court found this complaint lacked substance. The adjudicator was asked to value the A/C work, which included pipework, in the face of an allegation by POL that it was defective in design. The parties addressed the issues of defects and value, and the adjudicator was entitled to conclude that there was some defective pipework for which he made and was entitled to make an adjustment to the sum claims. What the adjudicator was saying in his award was that the defects he found to exist in the pipework were likely to affect the A/C. The parties had adequate opportunity to address the pipework issues. In Roe Brickwork, the parties were aware of the relevant material and the issues to which it gave rise had been canvassed before the adjudicator. He was also saying that the A/C could not be worth nothing nor be worth 100% of the sum claimed. He was doing his best with inadequate evidence to reach a fair value and could not be criticised for doing so. 
   
• Alleged failure to consider undisputed evidence - VMA’s complaint was that there was undisputed evidence that the cold water tanks were uninstalled and as to the value of those materials. The adjudicator ignored that value and substituted his own ‘guess’ as to the value. The court found that VMA was attempting to dress up a possible error of law or fact as a beach of natural justice. The court found the complaint misconceived. A failure to consider evidence to be taken into account must be deliberate, and that was not the case here. 
   

• Alleged arbitrary reductions - VMA pointed out that the adjudicator made reductions in three items, which he described as ‘arbitrary’: 

1. 1. Sanitaryware: 20%, £442.60 (Award paragraph 92); 
   2. Domestic water services: 50%, £16,953.88 (Award paragraph 101); and
      
   3. Heating pipework: 50 %, £16,253.15 (Award paragraph 105.2). 

The court decided that in using the word ‘arbitrary’, the adjudicator meant no more than that he was giving the best approximate valuation in the time available. This is exactly what the courts require adjudicators to do.  

Conclusions 

The key here was materiality. This was an experienced adjudicator evaluating, on a temporary basis, the true value of an interim payment application.  

The court noted that such ‘an application, which has to be valued in short order, usually on a monthly basis, would normally be assessed on a relatively rough and ready footing in the course of a project, if an item is undervalued in one month the applicant can produce more information to persuade the quantity surveyor or paying party to put in a higher figure. These interim applications and valuations are subject to the much more protracted and detailed process of the final account at the end of the project.’ 

In fact, standing back from the detail, this [was] a classic case of a losing party seeking ‘to comb through the adjudicator's reasons and identify points upon which to present a challenge under the labels ‘excess of jurisdiction’ or ‘breach of natural justice’. Moreover, the ‘task of the adjudicator is not to act as arbitrator or judge…but to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case’. That is what this adjudicator did. 

In these circumstances, VMA's three complaints, individually or cumulatively, would not have been material, even if the court had been persuaded by some or all of them. They did not go to the heart of the dispute. There was no perfect answer to the 13 items the adjudicator had to assess. There was a range of valuations of AFP8 to which the adjudicator might have come, consistent with natural justice. 

This was not the sort of case where the court may refuse enforcement because there had been unfairness on an ‘absolutely central issue’. VMA was not shut out from bringing forward their case, nor did the adjudicator go outside the wide and necessarily imprecise boundaries of what was permissible in considering an interim application for payment. 

POL was entitled to enforcement of the award, as claimed.

[1] Scheme for Construction Contracts (England & Wales) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/649).

[2] Scheme for Construction Contracts (England & Wales) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/2333). 

[3] Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/371). 

[4] Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998/687) (S.34). 

[5] Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1715) (W.194).

Kenneth Salmon MCIArb is a qualified solicitor in England, Wales and Eire. He is a Ciarb qualified and practising Mediator and Chair of Education at Ciarb North West Branch. Kenneth is a construction specialist currently working as a consultant to Slater Heelis Limited and Kuits LLP. He has extensive experience of all forms of dispute resolution including arbitration, adjudication, expert determination and mediation.  

He is the author of Cases on the Enforcement of Construction Adjudication Awards (2012) and the series Cases (on adjudication enforcement) published in Ciarb’s academic journal Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management 1999-2017 and as now published in Ciarb’s newsletter from 2018 to present.   

----------------- 
 
Other articles by Ken:
Adjudication Case Law Update 2025: Part 1 
Adjudication Case Law Update 2025: Part 2
Adjudication Case Law Update 2025: Part 3 
Adjudication Case Law Update 2025: Part 4

Adjudication Case Law Update 2024: Part 1
Adjudication Case Law Update 2024: Part 2
Adjudication Case Law Update 2024: Part 3
Adjudication Case Law Update 2024: Part 4 

Read more about adjudication.  

Develop your knowledge and skills in construction adjudication through our training courses.  

Find out more about how to apply to Ciarb's Adjudication Panel.